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Abstract. This is the second and final installment of an article based on a presentation, "Moral 
Assessment of Individuals in Idealistic Enterprises," by Ms. Jean Maria Arrigo at the 1998 Annual 
Convention of the American Psychological Association, San Francisco, California. In the first installment 
(September 4, 1998, IBPP, 5(10)), Ms. Arrigo explored the principles of competitive evolution and 
operationalization as they might morally and ethically impact on nuclear weapons-related research and 
on counterterrorist response to nuclear and biological terrorist attack. In the present installment (with 
very minor editing by IBPP), Ms. Arrigo continues exploring operationalization and then concludes with 
an analysis of moral assessment of participants in idealistic enterprises such as clandestine weapons 
research and counterterrorism. (For more information on Ms. Arrigo, see IBPP, 5(10). She can be 
contacted at jmarrigo@pacbell.net.) 
 
Operationalization. What about the operationalization of Levin's program (torture associated with 
interrogation of an alleged terrorist involved in an incipient "nuclear time bomb" attack on New York 
City)? At minimum, medical assistance is needed in support of torture associated with interrogation. The 
brain functions in a narrow range of metabolic parameters. When the torturer impairs the ability of the 
brain to withhold information, he or she impairs the ability of the brain to give information (9). 
Worldwide, physicians monitor torture victims for endurance, treat victims to prepare them for further 
torture, falsify autopsy reports, and so on(10). The Indian Medical Association surveyed its members and 
found that 58% considered torture associated with interrogation permissible, while 14% said they had 
witnessed it (11). 
 
As a second requirement for operations, Levin's project would have to coordinate with the 40 or so 
federal agencies that comprise the U.S. counterterrorism program (12). Loyalty, reliability, and 
accountability are crucial. According to Rood, outlaws or psychopaths could not be desirable as 
torturers. Instead, torturers would have to be well-trained and professional. To sit down and 
deliberately torture a person over a period of six weeks is asking a lot of a human being. And, therefore, 
you have to recruit them very carefully. Like the Nazi Death's Head SS, this elite corps would be isolated 
from other regular military and intelligence organizations: "one, because they were an elite group, but 
secondly because of the reputation they would have. None of us would want to keep company with 
them. You see, they've got 'dirty hands'." Their commanders would inevitably gain special powers--"That 
would be a Schellenberg or a Heinrich Himmler, or somebody like that," and his elite corps would 
destabilize military discipline and democratic process. 
 
So Levin's proposal, which had a strong utilitarian moral rationale at the beginning--saving New York City 
at the cost of a terrorist's family--looks much worse at the end. 
 
As Rood puts it, "The utilitarian argument would be that you don't get anything out of the terrorist by 
torturing him, and that you use up a lot of your people... and you don't get any return. So why would 
you build an institution to torture people?" 
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What would be a good mode of moral assessment of participants in idealistic enterprises such as 
clandestine scientific research? 
 
The judicial method. The President's Advisory Committee on Human Radiation Experiments reviewed 
4,000 radiation studies between 1944 and 1974(13). The Advisory Committee used a judicial method for 
assessment. I'll explain this, then introduce another method. 
 
The Advisory Committee sought to determine the damages to victims of radiation studies, the applicable 
moral principles, and the knowledge and intentions of the responsible researchers and administrators. 
With this heavy burden of proof, the Committee was unable to judge individual participants. The 
Committee chair, bioethicist Ruth Faden, said this at a 1996 bioethics conference(14): "[W]e clearly 
stated our view with regard to certain experiments being categorically unethical. But we did not take the 
next step of identifying particular individuals, whether they were investigators or government officials 
and saying, "These people in particular are morally blameworthy as individuals--and should be 
sanctioned...." Committee member Ruth Macklin explained the difficulties of investigation: [D]id we 
have enough [information] about specific individuals and what they did or did not do?" One of the 
physicians at Rochester who did the actual plutonium injecting did not know what he was injecting into 
people. That is, the whole operation was so secret. 
 
The Committee did not judge individuals because it could not get inside the black box: What did the 
accused know, think, intend? But getting inside the black box is just what the judicial method requires. 
 
Ecological method. I want to compare the judicial method with what I'll call an ecological method of 
moral assessment, explained by one of my oral history interviewees, West German social psychologist 
Stefan Hormuth. 
 
After the Berlin wall came down, Hormuth was a board member of the East German Psychological 
Society. He had a major role in restructuring almost all psychology departments in East German 
universities. There was general agreement that professors who had worked for the secret police should 
be dismissed. Communist Party membership had been required for tenure, but professors who had used 
Party membership for exploitation of others should also be dismissed. 
 
Hormuth's thinking about the political-ethical evaluations of East German faculty avoided the black-box 
problem. In an institution where there are many people filling approximately the same role and facing 
similar moral challenges, we can think of a population distribution of responses. 
 
Hormuth(15): "The positions and the roles we take in a certain society are open to us to interpret and 
make use of and find out what the real constraints are and what freedoms we have within those 
constraints.... 
 
There were people who behaved one way--gave up career and privileges [so as not to collaborate with 
the secret police or Communist Party]--and there were people who, under the same circumstances, 
behaved another way. That means there were degrees of freedom in this environment. How do people 
make use of those degrees of freedom?" 
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So we have a distribution of behavior, and for a particular purpose of moral assessment, we make the 
cut in one place or another. In East German university, collaborators of the secret police were dismissed, 
but in a borderline case, a professor was transferred to a lower research position without student 
contact. 
 
An imaginary case. Let's look at a judgment problem that could arise in Levin's interrogation and torture 
program. In the course of competitive innovation, the new field of pain management would probably be 
tapped. Researchers intentionally induce pain in dogs, cats, rats, and other laboratory animals to study 
mechanisms of pain and pain relief. During a conversation I had with him, John Liebeskind, one of the 
founders of the American Pain Society, was horrified by my observation, during a conversation, that his 
research could be applied to torture techniques. Liebeskind had never been involved in classified 
research, but he sent this reply in response to my question(16): "I don't think I am or would be in a good 
or well-informed position to assess the ethical consequences of any military project I might be asked to 
help with. They wouldn't tell me the truth (and I certainly wouldn't know if they had or not), and I 
wouldn't really understand all the ramifications even if they did or thought they did. So if we are 
developing something military and are in competition with other countries, I would feel an us vs. them 
dilemma, and there surely aren't very many thems I would trust more than us." 
 
Liebeskind's reply resonates with one the Advisory Committee cited in a radiation study it condemned. A 
Manhattan Project scientist said of participating physicians that "[T]hey realized it was something 
confidential (17). They could guess, and they probably didn't guess very wrong, but they were willing to 
cooperate just on the basis that this was an important thing." 
 
Like Liebeskind, the physicians implicitly trusted the idealistic motivation of the project and the 
necessity for secrecy. What they didn't reckon on was the moral problems that would arise as the 
project evolved through competitive innovation and operationalization. So it is not hard to imagine that 
a great humanitarian like Liebeskind could end up as an unwitting participant in an idealistic program of 
pain research with unacceptable moral developments. 
 
The judicial method of the Advisory Committee, in effect, excuses those who cooperate with national 
security projects from a position of trust and ignorance. The ecological method looks across the range of 




In closing, I present Stefan Hormuths moral challenge(18): "The consequence of not making a judgment 
is also really not knowing what you do, not if you were but if you really are in the same situation....If I 
say, 'I don't know what I would have done [in this situation, it] means if I really do come in that situation, 
I'm not prepared for it. I just say, "I don't know what to do'." 
 
Through application of the ecological method of moral assessment, we would instead develop our 
understanding of the moral opportunities available to us in idealistic institutional enterprises. (See (9) 
Hinkle, Lawrence. E. (1961). The physiological state of the interrogation subject as it affects brain 
function. In A.D. Biderman & H. Zimmer (Eds.), The manipulation of human behavior (pp. 19-49). New 
York: Wiley. p. 19; (10) An historical overview and bibliography appears in: Vesti, P., & Somnier, F. E. 
(1994). Doctor involvement in torture: An historical perspective. Journal of the International 
Rehabilitation Council for Torture Victims(Copenhagen, Denmark) 4 (3), 82-89; (11) 18.6% of a random 
sample of 4,000 members responded to the mail questionnaire. (Sobti, Jagdish C., Chhaparwal, B. C. 
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Choudhary, P. K., Holst, Erik, & Bhatnagar, N. K. (c. 1996). Knowledge, attitude and practice of physicians 
in India concerning medical aspects on torture. New Delhi: Indian Medical Association; (12) The Clinton 
administration's counter-terrorism plan involves an unwieldy array of more than 40 different federal 
agencies, bureaus and offices. (Anderson, James. (1998). Defending America against bioterrorism 
[Commentary page]. The Stars and Stripes. pp. 8; 17; (13) Advisory Committee on Human Radiation 
Experiments. (1994, October). Interim Report: Advisory Committee on Human Radiation Experiments. 
Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office. [Gov. Pubs. PR 42.8: R 11/H 88/INT]; (14) Mastroianni, 
A., & Kahn, Jeffrey (Co-chairs). (1996, November). Post-war government-sponsored radiation research. 
Symposium conducted at the meeting of the American Association of Bioethics, San Francisco, CA 
(Transcribed from official conference recordings. HMR Duplications, 4252 Coolidge Ave., Oakland, CA 
94602); (15) Hormuth, Stefan E. (1996, December 13). The reconstruction of East German universities 
after reunification. Oral history interview conducted by Jean Maria Arrigo at the University of California, 
Irvine, CA; (16) Liebeskind, John. (1995, October 30). Personal communication. Prof. Liebeskind has since 
died and I could not ask his permission for this quote, but I believe that he would prefer to contribute to 
an understanding of the moral vulnerabilities of highly principled scientists in classified research; (17) 
Advisory Committee. (1995). p. 641; (18) Hormuth, Stefan E. (1996, December 13). The reconstruction of 
East German universities after reunification. Oral history interview conducted by Jean Maria Arrigo at 
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